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Abstract 
 
The net foreign assets diverge since the early 2000s among the European 
Union (EU) countries: is this sustainable and what causes the divergence? 
This paper measures the persistence and the sources of shocks to the net 
foreign assets of twelve EU countries between 1972 and 2015. There is 
evidence of external adjustment to changes in external wealth but countries 
with the highest persistence of shocks see their net foreign assets diverging. 
The expansion of gross flows leads to this divergence of net foreign assets 
within the eurozone, implying whilst financial integration diversifies risk, it 
may lead to external imbalances.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The net foreign assets diverge since the early 2000s among the European 
Union (EU) countries (see Figure 1): is this sustainable and what causes the 
divergence? This divergence underlies the causes of the European sovereign 
debt crisis (Baldwin and Giavazzi, 2015; Brunnermeier and Reis, 2019): 
differences in wealth and liabilities highlight competitiveness problems, in 
economies with current account deficits and high external debt, accumulated 
liabilities raise the possibility of sudden stop in capital flows and the risk of 
macroeconomic crisis (Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti, 2012). The flow 
imbalances peak prior to the global financial crisis of 2008 and have narrowed 
since but considerable stock imbalances remain. 
 
This paper measures the persistence and the sources of shocks to the net 
foreign assets in twelve EU countries (EU12) between 1972 and 2015. We use 
the persistence measures developed by Lee, Pesaran and Pierse (1992, 1993) 
and trace their evolution over time via the persistence profiles (Lee and 
Pesaran, 1993). The persistence measure captures the infinite-horizon effects 
of shocks to a nonstationary process and is scaled to the impact effects of the 
shocks. Using this measure, we could infer the presence of external 
adjustment, highlight countries that have high persistence of shocks therefore 
more susceptible to external imbalances. Although nonstationarity or large 
persistent measures are consistent with sustainability (Bohn, 2007; Antonini, 
Lee and Pires, 2013), rising net foreign liabilities could raise political pressure 
and financial stress during crisis. Large persistence measures also risk hurting 
its competitiveness against the rest of the world during normal times, as shown 
by Chen et. al (2013). With the estimated persistence measures, we could 
estimate the steady states at each time with the Beveridge-Nelson (1981) 
trends. Finally, we decompose the persistence measures by shocks to cross-
border financial flows, common fluctuations in output and the dollar exchange 
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rate, where significant persistence measures would identify the long-run driver 
of the net foreign assets. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature by complementing the trend view of the 
net foreign assets. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) characterize the net foreign 
assets as a nonstationary process driven by demographics, stage of 
development and public debt, all of which are trended or slow-moving. 
Consistent with the literature, we also model the net foreign assets as a 
nonstationary process but elaborate on this non-stationarity as the persistence 
measure could range between zero and infinity. We also add to the trend view 
with financial integration as a long-run driver of the net foreign assets 
amongst the eurozone countries. This finding supports Hale and Obstfeld 
(2016) who analyze international debt flows within and outside the eurozone, 
finding that after the euro’s introduction, euro core countries borrow from 
outside of the eurozone and lend to the euro periphery countries, leading to 
external imbalances within and beyond the eurozone. Our findings also 
confirm European Economic Advisory Group (2012) who argue that the 
imbalances in the euro area originate in the capital market. 
 
We use the updated External Wealth of Nations (EWN) dataset (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, 2018), including as many EU countries as possible and the 
longest time series. We end up with the EU12 economies between 1972 and 
2015: the UK, Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Greece, Portugal and Spain2. We focus on the EU 
economies because of the role of external balances in the European sovereign 
debt crisis and its subsequent inclusion in the macroeconomic surveillance 
framework (European Commission, 2012); furthermore, gravity factors 
(distance, language), trade and common institutional regime (the EU, the euro) 
 
2 We exclude Ireland and Finland due to large fluctuations of their net foreign assets that 
would affect the estimates of the multi-country system. 
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drive bilateral holdings that make the net foreign assets (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2008a; Galstyan, Mehigan and Mercado, 2020). These 
interdependencies between countries are taken into account with a multi-
country vector autoregression.  
  
We find the expansion of gross flows, measured by the financial integration 
leads to divergence of net foreign assets of several euro-area economies: 
France, Germany, Greece, Portugal and Spain. These countries have the 
highest persistence of shocks to their net foreign assets. In other countries: 
Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland, there is evidence of external 
adjustment where the persistence measures are less than one implying the 
long-run cumulative effects of shocks are less than their impact effects. 
Countries take between 4 and 10 years to adjust to new steady states following 
a shock to the net foreign assets. When we compare the net foreign assets with 
their steady states based on historical and cross-country dynamics, Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Greece, Portugal and Spain have deviated from 
their steady states persistently since 2000s.   
    
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes how we characterize the 
dynamics of net foreign assets following Antonini, Lee and Pires (2013) and 
Lee and Pesaran (1993). Section 3 describes the data, the multi-country model 
and the results. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2 Characterizing Net Foreign Assets Dynamics 
 
We characterize the time series properties of the net foreign assets, like a stock 
variable, as a nonstationary process. This is consistent with both the cyclical 
and the trend views of the net foreign assets that complement each other in 
explaining the global imbalances. In the cyclical view (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 
1995), the net foreign assets is modelled as a state variable: a shock that could 
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be money shock, government spending shock or productivity shocks changes 
the current account and the net foreign assets; the net foreign assets would stay 
at the new level, known as the hysteresis property and treated as given in the 
optimization problems of the next periods. In the trend view, the net foreign 
assets are driven by persistent factors such as the demographic factors, the 
government debt and the economy's stage of development3. 
 
The dynamics of net foreign assets:GDP ratios in EU12 countries can be 
modelled through a simple vector autoregression (VAR) explaining the change 
in the ratio of each country in terms of its own recent past and the past values 
of the change in the ratios in related countries. Denoting the net foreign 
assets:GDP ratio in each country 𝑖 at time 𝑡 by 𝑛𝑓𝑎&'	and modelling 𝑛𝑓𝑎&' as 
integrated of order 1 (I(1)) consistent with the description earlier, we can 
characterize the time series of the countries’ ratios with the Wold 
representation: 
Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎' = 𝜇 + 𝐶(𝐿)𝜀' 
(1) 
where 𝑛𝑓𝑎' = (𝑛𝑓𝑎2' , 𝑛𝑓𝑎4' , … , 𝑛𝑓𝑎6')′ is the 𝑚 × 1 vector containing the 
net foreign assets ratio for the 𝑚 countries of interest, 𝜇 is a vector of 
constants, 𝐶(𝐿) = 𝐼 + 𝐶2𝐿 +⋯+ 𝐶=𝐿= is a 𝑝-order matrix polynomial in the 
lag operator 𝐿, 𝐶? are 𝑚 ×𝑚 matrices of parameters, and 𝜀' is the 𝑚 × 1 one-
step-ahead forecast errors in Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎' given information on lagged values of 
Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎'. The 𝜀' are serially uncorrelated with mean zero and covariance Ω. The 
representation in (1) can capture cross-country interdependencies, including 
the effect of innovations to countries’ net foreign assets that are correlated 
contemporaneously (through Ω) and the feedbacks across the countries’ net 
 
3 Public debt is empirically found to be integrated of order one (Antonini, Lee and Pires, 
2013); output per capita is I(1) because in the Cobb Douglas production function, the  
technology is the cumulation of productivity shocks (Garatt, Lee, Pesaran and Shin, 2012). 
Demography is a slow-moving variable. 
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foreign assets ratios over time (through the 𝐶&), and so provides a useful 
vehicle to describe net foreign assets dynamics.  
 
Following Lee, Pesaran and Pierse (1992, 1993), the long-run properties of the 
net foreign assets dynamics is captured by the 𝑚 ×𝑚 matrix P whose (𝑖, 𝑗)th 
element is given by 
𝜌&? = 𝑒&
D𝐶(1)Ω𝐶(1)′𝑒?
E(e&DC(0)ΩC(0)D𝑒&)Ie?DC(0)ΩC(0)D𝑒?J
, 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,… ,𝑚 
 (2) 
where 𝑒& is the 𝑚 × 1 selection vector with unity in its 𝑖th element and zeroes 
elsewhere. The “persistence matrix” P provides a variance-based measure of 
the infinite-horizon effect of shocks to the system. It is easily interpreted by 
considering the measures 𝑃& = L𝜌&& based on its diagonal elements. These 
measures show the size of the permanent effect of a shock to the system that 
causes net foreign assets in that country 𝑖 to rise by 1% on impact. In the 
univariate case, the measure coincides with the “impulse-based” measure of 
persistence, describing the infinite horizon effect of a 1% shock to the 
variable, therefore the two concepts are related. However, the variance-based 
measure has the advantage that it does not require, and indeed is invariant to, 
the identifying assumptions necessary to provide structural meaning to the 
shocks in an impulse response analysis conducted in a multivariate setting. 
The moving average representation at (1) accommodates the possibility that 
the instantaneous effect of shocks are gradually eroded over time so that the 
persistence measure can be close to or equal to zero (as it would be if the net 
foreign assets ratio series was actually stationary). The 𝑃& therefore provides a 
continuous measure of the extent of the permanent effect of shocks to country 
i’s net foreign assets, elaborating in a useful way on the usual dichotomous 
characterisation between I(0) and I(1) series.  
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We can trace the time profile of the effect of shocks measured by 𝑃& at the 
infinite horizon, defining P(n) as the matrix whose (𝑖, 𝑗)th element is given by  
  
𝜌&?(𝑛) = 𝑒&
D𝐻(𝑛)𝑒?
E(e&DC(0)ΩC(0)D𝑒&)Ie?DC(0)ΩC(0)D𝑒?J	
 
(3)  
where 𝐻(𝑛) = (∑ 𝐶&O&PQ )Ω(∑ 𝐶&O&PQ )D for 𝑛 = 0,1, …. Here the 𝐻(𝑛) capture 
the size of the permanent effects of the shocks as they accumulate over time 
up to period 𝑛. Clearly, the 𝑃(𝑛) converge to the persistence matrix 𝑃 as 𝑛 →
∞ and the “persistence profiles,” defined by the individual country-specific 
measures 𝑃&(𝑛) = L𝜌&&(𝑛), also converge to 𝑃& as 𝑛 → ∞. These profiles will 
provide a useful characterization of net foreign assets dynamics, that again 
avoids the need for any structural assumption.  
 
We could decompose the shocks to net foreign assets in the Wold 
representation of (1) so we can describe the way in which different types of 
system-wide shocks impact on countries’ net foreign assets:GDP ratios and 
how their effects are propagated over time. Specifically, suppose 𝑥' is a vector 
of EU-wide aggregates that will impact, in different ways and over different 
time scales, on net foreign assets of the EU economies; the vector might 
include EU12 aggregate output, say, so that we can consider the effect of a 
slowdown in growth on the individual economies’ net foreign assets. Assume 
that the innovations in these aggregates are given by 
𝑣' = 𝑥' − ΓzY 
(4) 
with mean zero and variance Ψ and where the Γ are fixed parameters and the 
zY are a set of predetermined variables. Then we can generalize (1) to write  
 
Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎' = 𝜇 + 𝐷(𝐿)𝑣' + 𝐶(𝐿)𝜀' 
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(5) 
where 𝐷(𝐿) = 𝐼 + 𝐷2𝐿 +⋯+ 𝐷\𝐿\ is a matrix of lag polynomials capturing 
the effects of the identified system-wide shocks and the 𝜀' are now interpreted 
as “other, unidentified” innovations to net foreign assets assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the 𝑣'. In this case, the matrix 𝑃(𝑛) is defined by its (𝑖, 𝑗)th 
element in a way that can be decomposed: 
𝜌&?(𝑛) = 𝜌]&?(𝑛) + 𝜌^&?(𝑛) 
(6) 
where 
𝜌]&?(𝑛) = 𝑒&
D𝐹(𝑛)𝑒?
E(𝑒&D𝐻(0)𝑒&)I𝑒?D𝐻(0)D𝑒?J
, 𝜌^&?(𝑛) = 𝑒&
D𝐺(𝑛)𝑒?
E(𝑒&D𝐻(0)𝑒&)I𝑒?D𝐻(0)D𝑒?J
	 
 
𝐹(𝑛) = (∑ 𝐷&O&PQ )Ψ(∑ 𝐷&O&PQ )′, 𝐺(𝑛) = (∑ 𝐶&O&PQ )Ω(∑ 𝐶&O&PQ )′, and 𝐻(𝑛) =
(∑ 𝐷&O&PQ )Ψ(∑ 𝐷&O&PQ )′ + (∑ 𝐶&O&PQ )Ω(∑ 𝐶&O&PQ )′ for 𝑛 = 0,1, … The profiles 
described by 𝑃]&(𝑛) = L𝜌]&&(𝑛) and  𝑃 &(𝑛) = L𝜌^&&(𝑛) summarize the 
effects of the identified EU-wide shocks and the unidentified shocks on each 
countries’ net foreign assets, and the scaling reflect the size of the identified 
and unidentified shocks on impact.   
 
3 Net Foreign Assets in EU12 Countries 
 
We first inspect the data and test if there is a unit root in the data. Having 
established the net foreign assets as a unit root process, we measure the 
persistence of shocks to the net foreign assets. Finally, we decompose the 
persistence measures by shocks to the cross-border financial flows, common 
fluctuations in output and the dollar exchange rate.  
 
3.1 Data Overview 
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With the exception of Switzerland, the net foreign assets-to-GDP range 
between -60% and 20% of GDP from 1972 to the late 1990s but the range has 
grown to between –140% and 60% of GDP in 2015 (see Figure 1). The debtor 
countries: Greece, Portugal and Spain have built in excess of 100% of GDP of 
net foreign liabilities whilst the creditor countries: Germany, Denmark and the 
Netherlands have accumulated to nearly 50% of GDP. Switzerland has always 
had high net foreign assets throughout the sample but like other countries, its 
net foreign assets trends upward since 1990s before returning to 80% in 2015. 
 
We test for unit roots in the net foreign assets data based on unit root tests 
with and without cross-section dependence: we do not reject the unit root null 
hypothesis for the net foreign assets but reject the null for the net foreign 
assets in first difference. Tables 1 and 2 report the augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) test statistics for the levels and the first differences respectively for the 
individual countries and the panel unit root test statistics (Im, Pesaran and 
Shin, 2003) across different lag lengths. Tables 3 and 4 report the cross-
sectional ADF (CADF) test statistics for the levels and the first differences for 
the individual countries and the panel unit root test statistics (Pesaran, 2007). 
We see evidence of the unit root null hypothesis not rejected for the levels but 
rejected for the first differences, most convincingly based on the panel unit 
root test statistics that is more powerful than individual countries’ unit root 
statistics. Having established the net foreign assets as a unit root process, we 
estimate the persistence effects of shocks to the net foreign assets. 
 
3.2 The Multi-country Model 
 
We measure the long-run effect of a shock based on a multi-country VAR that 
models feedbacks over time and across countries. An unrestricted VAR (M1) 
is one in which Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎&' is regressed on its own lags and lags of other countries 
individually but is impractical due to the length of our data. The most general 
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model is therefore model M2 that is a VAR of order 𝑟 that regresses Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎&' on 
its own lags and lags of the rest of EU12, denoted as Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎b&,' =
∑ Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎?,'6?P2,?c& . We conduct a search on models from M2 to a random walk: 
𝑀4: Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎&' = 𝛼& +g𝛽i,&Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎&,'bi
j
iP2
+g𝛾i,&Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎b&,'bi
j
iP2
+ 𝜀&' , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑚 
 (7) 
 
𝑀l: the specific model of 𝑀4, where coefficients with t-ratio below unity (in 
absolute value) are excluded  
 (8) 
 
𝑀m: Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎&' = 𝛼& +g𝛽i,&Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎&,'bi
j
iP2
+ 𝜀&' , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑚 
 (9) 
 
𝑀m: Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎&' = 𝛼& + 𝜀&' , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑚 
 (10) 
We specify a search on M2 where we drop coefficients whose t-ratios are less 
than one in absolute value to obtain M3. This improves the parsimony of the 
model and the precision of the persistence measures. M4 is an autoregressive 
model that captures the feedbacks across time; M5 is a random walk. We 
estimate the four models for the EU12 countries between 1972 and 2015 with 
the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) to take into account 
simultaneous cross-country correlations of residuals4. We compare the models 
with likelihood ratio test statistics against the critical values of 𝜒4 distribution 
given the restrictions of one model against another. Table 5 reports the log-
likelihood values and the likelihood ratio tests.   
 
4 In the case of the unrestricted VAR model, M1, the FIML and the OLS estimates coincide. In 
the case of restricted VAR models, M2 and M3, the FIML estimates are computed by iterating 
on the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations (SURE) estimates.  
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The specific multi-country model 𝑀l is the preferred model from Table 5. We 
do not reject model 𝑀l against model 𝑀4 where the likelihood ratio test 
statistic is 27.36 against the 𝜒4Q4  critical value. In contrast, we reject the 
autoregressive model 𝑀m against the multi-country models 𝑀4 and 𝑀l, 
implying the relevance of cross-country influences in the data. We reject the 
random walk 𝑀o against all other models, implying the relevance of the short-
run dynamics and the cross-country influences. Therefore, we compute the 
persistence measures (2) from the Wold representation of the multi-country 
models 𝑀4 and 𝑀l.  
 
Taking the EU12 as a whole, the long-run effect of a percent shock to the net 
foreign assets is 0.74 percent, but the permanent effects range between 0.60 
and 1.23 across countries. As expected, the persistence measures based on 
model 𝑀l are more precise than those obtained from model 𝑀4 for all 
countries on Table 6. The aggregate persistence measure of less than one 
implies the presence of external adjustment i.e. counteracting effects to the 
impact effects of the shocks to the net foreign assets: long-run budget 
constraint means that creditors would run trade deficits and debtors would run 
trade surpluses. Countries with the highest persistence measures are Denmark, 
Germany, Sweden, Greece, Portugal and Spain, whose net foreign assets 
diverge on Figure 1.  
 
Economies take between four and ten years to adjust to a new equilibrium 
following a shock to the net foreign assets. Figure 2 plots the persistence 
profiles from its impact effect to 15 years after the shock occurs. Subsequent 
to a percent shock, there are cases where the short-run exceed the long-run 
effect e.g. Germany and cases where the short-run effects oscillate e.g. the 
UK, Austria, France, reflecting the complexity and delays in macroeconomic 
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or policy responses. Furthermore, it takes nearly 10 years for Austria and 
France to adjust to its long-run value but less than 5 years for other countries. 
 
We could compute the steady states or the long-run values of the net foreign 
assets at each period with both the persistence measures and the shocks.  The 
persistence measures of Table 6 and the associated profiles in Figure 2 are 
scaled to show the effect of a shock that causes the net foreign assets:GDP 
ratio to rise in that country by 1% on impact; they characterize the dynamic 
effects of shocks, but do not provide information on the shocks that have 
impacted on countries. The Beveridge and Nelson (1981) (BN) trends in the 
net foreign assets:GDP ratio provide information on this based on the 
estimated model 𝑀l. The BN trend associated with the model in (1) is defined 
by 𝑛𝑓𝑎p ' = 𝑛𝑓𝑎p 'b2 + 𝜇 + 𝐶(1)𝜀' so that it evolves through time accumulating 
the infinite-horizon effect of the innovations to the series. It is effectively the 
infinite-horizon forecast of the series obtained once the effects of past shocks 
have worked their way through the system and in the absence of any 
subsequent innovations. The BN trends are therefore readily interpreted as the 
“steady-state” net foreign assets:GDP ratio at each point in time. 
 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece, Portugal and Spain have 
deviated persistently from their steady states since the 2000s based on the 
historical dynamics of net foreign assets. We locate the BN trends in level by 
assuming that the net foreign assets:GDP ratios were all at steady state in the 
year 20005. Figure 3 plot the net foreign assets and their steady states by 
distinguishing two groups of countries: one with and without a persistent gap 
between the net foreign assets and their steady states since the 2000s. The 
 
5 One could argue that most countries were close to their steady state in the run up to, or 
shortly after the adoption of the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997. We check the robustness 
of the results by varying the year to a few years before and after 2000.  
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latter group includes the UK, Austria, France, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland 
whose net foreign assets have fluctuated around their steady states.  
 
3.3 The Source of Shocks  
 
We turn to the decomposition of shocks and their contribution to persistence 
following the discussion around (4) and (5). The analysis takes its starting 
point model M2 where the shock in (7) has been decomposed into p different 
types of shocks, 𝜈?,', 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑝 and innovations, 𝜀&̃' orthogonal to 𝜈?,' as 
follows: 
𝑀s4: Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎&' = 𝛼& +g𝛽i,&&Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎&,'bi
j
iP2
+	g𝛾i,&Δ𝑛𝑓𝑎b&,'bi
j
iP2
	
+gg𝛿&,?
j
iPQ
𝜈?,'bi
=
?P2
+ 𝜀&̃' 
(11) 
 
where m = 12, r = 2, and p is the number of shocks. We consider three shocks 
that affect the net foreign assets ratios: namely, shocks to EU12 financial 
integration (𝐹𝐼'), shocks to EU12 output (𝑌') and shocks to the dollar effective 
exchange rate (𝐸𝑋'), which we define later. We compute the shocks from 
regressing each variable on its own lags as follows:  
 
𝑥?,' = λQ? +gλy?𝑥?,'by
\
yP2
+ 𝜈?,' , 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3 
(12) 
 
where 𝑥?,' is the 𝐹𝐼', the logarithm of 𝑌' and the logarithm of 𝐸𝑋' in turn, q 
denotes the lags. Enough lags are included so there is no serial correlation in 
the residuals. Model 𝑀s4 consists of (11) and (12), which can be estimated 
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jointly using FIML. Model 𝑀sl is where specification search is conducted on 
model 𝑀s4 to improve the parsimony of the estimated model. Information 
criteria (AIC and BIC) are used to compare the general model 𝑀s4 and the 
specific model 𝑀sl. The estimated model can be inverted to obtain the estimate 
of the moving average form of (5) and the estimates of the associated 
persistence profiles described in (6).  
 
In an environment of greater elasticity of capital flows, financial integration 
lowers interest rates that encourages borrowing and lending across countries: 
we define the EU12 financial integration as the cross-country average of 
international financial integration6. We further probe if common fluctuations 
in output drive the net foreign assets in the long run, defining the EU12 output 
as the sum of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) across the EU12. Current 
account imbalances might reflect the convergence mechanism between the EU 
core economies and the EU peripheral economies (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 
2002). Finally, we probe if the exchange rate fluctuations are important long-
run determinants of the net foreign assets in the EU, using the dollar effective 
exchange rate i.e. trade weighted bilateral nominal exchange rates as we have 
legacy European currencies, British pound, Swiss franc, Danish krone  and 
Swedish krona. The dollar is the world reserve currency; exchange rate can 
affect the net foreign assets via two channels---first, via the net valuation 
changes directly (to the extent there is a currency mismatch); second, via the 
current account balance indirectly. Gourinchas and Rey (2014) discuss the 
external adjustment and the valuation effects extensively.  We obtain the 
EU12 financial integration and the EU12 output from the EWN dataset; the 
dollar effective exchange rate from the Bank of International Settlements.    
 
 
6 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) define the measure of international financial integration 
as 𝐼𝐹𝐼𝐺𝐷𝑃&' = |}~|~~  where FA(FL) denotes the stock of external assets (liabilities).  
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The model in (11) and (12) can be viewed as the reduced form of a structural 
model explaining countries’ net foreign assets ratios, financial integration, 
outputs and dollar exchange rates. The structural model would embody the 
relevant autonomous economic relationships, specifying contemporaneous 
relationships between variables, and the associated innovations would have a 
behavioural interpretation in terms of financial integration, or output or 
exchange rate shocks, say. The 𝜀&̃' and 𝑣?,' obtained from the autoregressions 
of (11) and (12) represent the corresponding reduced-form errors and do not 
have a straightforward behavioural interpretation. Identification of the effects 
of the behavioural structural shocks requires theory-based restrictions on the 
contemporaneous relationships between variables so that these errors can be 
recovered.     
 
Despite the absence of a compelling theory of the short run, we consider the 
effects of the reduced-form shocks to the financial integration, outputs and 
dollar exchange rates equations, recognizing that these represent an amalgam 
of the underlying behavioural shocks. The persistence measures of (6) 
describe the effects of a typical shock to the system, taking into account the 
fact that an unexpected change in financial integration, captured here by a 
shock to the reduced-form financial integration equation, typically coincides 
with an unexpected change in output and indeed in all the other variables of 
the system. The persistence measures therefore accommodate the complicated 
contemporaneous interrelationships that exist in practice between the financial 
integration, the output and the dollar exchange rate. The measures do not rely 
on short-run identifying assumption, unlike a Cholesky decomposition for 
example, and are invariant to the ordering of the variables in the VAR. The 
effect of the shocks captured by the persistence measures should not be 
interpreted as the effect of a particular policy undertaken in isolation, then, but 
rather as showing the effects of the policy taking into account also the 
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contemporaneous responses of all the other variables expected to occur on the 
basis of what has been observed historically.  
 
Table 7 shows the results of the decomposition of the countries’ and aggregate 
persistence measures by type of shock obtained on the basis of estimated 
version of model  𝑀sl. The total persistence measures in the last column of 
Table 7 are similar to the persistence measures on Table 6 with a larger 
standard error: for the EU12 as a whole, the measure is 0.99 and the countries 
with the highest total persistence measures on Table 7 are similar to Table 6: 
Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, Greece, Portugal and Spain.   
 
In terms of the sources of shocks, unexpected changes in the financial 
integration has the largest persistence on the EU12, 1.03 via the eurozone 
countries: France, Germany, Greece, Portugal and Spain that have large and 
significant persistence measures. There is evidence that both common output 
and exchange rate fluctuations are long-run determinants in a few countries 
(Denmark, Germany and Sweden for the EU12 output; the UK, Germany and 
Sweden for the dollar effective exchange rate) but not on the EU12, where the 
aggregate persistence measures are insignificant, 0.02 and 0.15 with standard 
errors of 0.38 and 0.34 respectively.  
 
The EU12 financial integration, measured by the cross-country average size of 
individual countries’ international balance sheet to GDP, has risen from less 
than one in 1972 to more than seven in 2015, representing the most prominent 
surge of cross-border financial flows in the world since the 1990s (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, 2008b).  Figure 4 plots the financial integration and the 
forecast errors: we fit a constant, a deterministic trend and five lags of the 
financial integration. The financial flows accelerate since 1990s and tapers off 
after the financial crisis and the euro crisis of 2008 and 2010; the forecast 
errors also reflect these adverse events. The spikes of forecast errors between 
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2003 and 2007 are interpreted as ‘credit supply shocks’ (Lane, 2013) 
reflecting financial innovation and cross-border banking in Europe (Shin, 
2012; Hale and Obstfeld, 2016).  
 
The sudden expansion of gross flows affects the eurozone more than other 
countries in EU12, seen via the significant persistence measures in France, 
Germany, Greece, Portugal and Spain. One explanation is the elimination of 
currency risk within the eurozone accelerates cross-border financial flows. In 
addition, the absence of exchange rate does not help external adjustment and 
the transfer from debtor countries to creditor countries (Bleaney and Tian, 
2014). During the global financial crisis, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) find 
that the euro has not facilitated the external adjustment of the economies.  
 
4. Concluding Comments 
 
The expansion of gross flows, measured by the financial integration, widens 
the external imbalances within the eurozone: France, Germany, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain. Prior to the European Sovereign Debt crisis, most of the 
flow imbalances have been financed by debt flows (Lane, 2013); the sudden 
drying up of the credit markets trigger the crisis as debt is riskier with its 
repayment obligations and therefore subjected to sustainability reassessment. 
Our analysis further shows the same economies except France have deviated 
persistently from their steady state since the 2000s based on historical 
dynamics of the net foreign assets. 
 
Whilst there are advantages to financial integration, notably risk-sharing, it 
also carries the cost of exacerbating external imbalances when putting 
countries at the risk of debt crises as our study find within a monetary union.  
Devereux and Yu (2019) has pointed a related but different point i.e. financial 
integration spreads crises as it increases global leverage. There is a case for 
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policy makers to monitor the gross financial flows, particularly debt flows, the 
debt-equity composition of a country's balance sheet as well as facilitating 
external adjustment within a monetary union. 
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Figure 1. Countries’ Net Foreign Assets:GDP Ratios
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
-140%
-120%
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
1
97
2
1
97
3
1
97
4
1
97
5
1
97
6
1
97
7
1
97
8
1
97
9
1
98
0
1
98
1
1
98
2
1
98
3
1
98
4
1
98
5
1
98
6
1
98
7
1
98
8
1
98
9
1
99
0
1
99
1
1
99
2
1
99
3
1
99
4
1
99
5
1
99
6
1
99
7
1
99
8
1
99
9
2
00
0
2
00
1
2
00
2
2
00
3
2
00
4
2
00
5
2
00
6
2
00
7
2
00
8
2
00
9
2
01
0
2
01
1
2
01
2
2
01
3
2
01
4
2
01
5
UK
Austria
Denmark
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Sweden
Greece
Portugal
Spain
Switzerland
Notes: Right axis: Switzerland; left axis: other countries.
Figure 2. Persistence Profiles Measures
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Figure 3. Net Foreign Assets and Beveridge-Nelson (1981) Trends: Gap less
than 10% of GDP between the net foreign assets and their steady states
-70%
-50%
-30%
-10%
10%
30%
50%
70%
1
97
5
1
97
7
1
97
9
1
98
1
1
98
3
1
98
5
1
98
7
1
98
9
1
99
1
1
99
3
1
99
5
1
99
7
1
99
9
2
00
1
2
00
3
2
00
5
2
00
7
2
00
9
2
01
1
2
01
3
2
01
5
UK
-130%
-110%
-90%
-70%
-50%
-30%
-10%
10%
1
97
5
1
97
7
1
97
9
1
98
1
1
98
3
1
98
5
1
98
7
1
98
9
1
99
1
1
99
3
1
99
5
1
99
7
1
99
9
2
00
1
2
00
3
2
00
5
2
00
7
2
00
9
2
01
1
2
01
3
2
01
5
Austria
-70%
-50%
-30%
-10%
10%
30%
50%
70%
1
97
5
1
97
7
1
97
9
1
98
1
1
98
3
1
98
5
1
98
7
1
98
9
1
99
1
1
99
3
1
99
5
1
99
7
1
99
9
2
00
1
2
00
3
2
00
5
2
00
7
2
00
9
2
01
1
2
01
3
2
01
5
France
-70%
-50%
-30%
-10%
10%
30%
50%
70%
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
Italy
-70%
-50%
-30%
-10%
10%
30%
50%
70%
1
97
5
1
97
7
1
97
9
1
98
1
1
98
3
1
98
5
1
98
7
1
98
9
1
99
1
1
99
3
1
99
5
1
99
7
1
99
9
2
00
1
2
00
3
2
00
5
2
00
7
2
00
9
2
01
1
2
01
3
2
01
5
Sweden
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
1
97
5
1
97
7
1
97
9
1
98
1
1
98
3
1
98
5
1
98
7
1
98
9
1
99
1
1
99
3
1
99
5
1
99
7
1
99
9
2
00
1
2
00
3
2
00
5
2
00
7
2
00
9
2
01
1
2
01
3
2
01
5
Switzerland
Notes: blue solid: net foreign assets/gdp; red dashed: Beveridge-Nelson (1981) trends.
23
Figure 3. Net Foreign Assets and Beveridge-Nelson (1981) Trends: Gap more
than 10% of GDP between the net foreign assets and their steady states
-70%
-50%
-30%
-10%
10%
30%
50%
70%
1
97
5
1
97
7
1
97
9
1
98
1
1
98
3
1
98
5
1
98
7
1
98
9
1
99
1
1
99
3
1
99
5
1
99
7
1
99
9
2
00
1
2
00
3
2
00
5
2
00
7
2
00
9
2
01
1
2
01
3
2
01
5
Denmark
-70%
-50%
-30%
-10%
10%
30%
50%
70%
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
Germany
-70%
-50%
-30%
-10%
10%
30%
50%
70%
1
97
5
1
97
7
1
97
9
1
98
1
1
98
3
1
98
5
1
98
7
1
98
9
1
99
1
1
99
3
1
99
5
1
99
7
1
99
9
2
00
1
2
00
3
2
00
5
2
00
7
2
00
9
2
01
1
2
01
3
2
01
5
Netherlands
-140%
-120%
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
1
97
5
1
97
7
1
97
9
1
98
1
1
98
3
1
98
5
1
98
7
1
98
9
1
99
1
1
99
3
1
99
5
1
99
7
1
99
9
2
00
1
2
00
3
2
00
5
2
00
7
2
00
9
2
01
1
2
01
3
2
01
5
Greece
-140%
-120%
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
Portugal
-140%
-120%
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
Spain
Notes: blue solid: net foreign assets/gdp; red dashed: Beveridge-Nelson (1981) trends.
24
Figure 4. EU12 Financial Integration, EU12 GDP and The Dollar Effective
Exchange Rate
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TABLE 1 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER TESTS FOR UNIT ROOTS ON NET FOREIGN ASSETS:GDP RATIOS, 
1972-2015 
    ADF(1)   ADF(2)   ADF(3)   ADF(4) 
UK  -2.53**  -2.31  -3.10***  -2.24 
Austria  -1.26  -0.19  -0.47  -0.78 
Denmark  -2.09  -2.02  -1.44  -1.38 
France  -2.14  -1.31  -1.39  -1.88 
Germany  -0.08  -0.07  -0.49  -0.54 
Italy  -2.25  -2.02  -1.91  -2.02 
Netherlands  1.36  0.86  0.78  0.78 
Sweden  -1.12  -0.94  -0.85  -1.19 
Switzerland  -1.43  -0.96  -1.84  -1.81 
Greece  -1.00  -0.25  -1.50  -1.19 
Portugal  -1.34  -1.22  -2.17  -1.77 
Spain  -1.45  -1.36  -1.77  -1.94 
Mean  -1.28  -0.98  -1.35  -1.33 
(IPS test stat) 3.62  4.43  2.87  2.56 
                  
Notes:  ADF(p) statistics are computed using ADF regressions with an intercept, a linear trend, and p lagged differences of the 
dependent variable. The 1%,  5% and 10% critical values are -2.63, -2.50 and -2.42. The IPS test statistic is the normalized 
value of the mean of the ADF statistics and is compared to the standard normal distribution. * denotes significance at the 10% 
level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and ***denotes significance at the 1% level.   
 
TABLE 2 
AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER TESTS FOR UNIT ROOTS IN THE CHANGE OF NET FOREIGN 
ASSETS:GDP RATIOS, 1972-2015 
    ADF(0)   ADF(1)   ADF(2)   ADF(3) 
UK  -8.35***  -5.50***  -2.87*  -3.93*** 
Austria  -6.26***  -6.10***  -3.24**  -2.26 
Denmark  -4.79***  -3.32**  -3.32**  -2.61* 
France  -5.90***  -6.04***  -4.08***  -2.62* 
Germany  -4.48***  -3.26**  -1.84  -1.55 
Italy  -7.56***  -5.29***  -4.25***  -3.32** 
Netherlands  -6.79***  -2.89*  -2.05  -1.66 
Sweden  -5.83***  -4.37***  -3.36**  -2.09 
Switzerland  -8.38***  -5.76***  -2.73*  -2.50 
Greece  -7.54***  -6.02***  -2.32  -2.63* 
Portugal  -5.65***  -4.31***  -2.22  -2.58 
Spain  -7.59***  -4.65***  -2.42  -1.98 
Mean  -6.59***  -4.79***  -2.89**  -2.48 
(IPS test stat) -21.13***  -13.24***  -5.70***  -3.95*** 
                  
Notes:  ADF(p) statistics are computed using ADF regressions with an intercept and p lagged differences of the dependent 
variable. The 1%,  5% and 10% critical values are -3.60, -2.93 and -2.60. The IPS test statistic is the normalized value of the 
mean of the ADF statistics and is compared to the standard normal distribution. * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** 
denotes significance at the 5% level, and ***denotes significance at the 1% level.   
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TABLE 3 
CROSS-SECTIONALLY AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER TESTS FOR UNIT ROOTS ON NET FOREIGN 
ASSETS:GDP RATIOS, 1972-2015 
    CADF(1)   CADF(2)   CADF(3)   CADF(4) 
UK  -3.88**  -3.27  -2.22  -1.46 
Austria  -1.21  -0.17  -0.30  -0.60 
Denmark  -1.95  -1.64  -0.51  -0.77 
France  -1.20  -0.69  -0.62  -2.30 
Germany  -0.33  -0.85  -0.24  -0.81 
Italy  -2.26  -2.45  -1.61  -2.41 
Netherlands  0.88  0.72  0.74  0.80 
Sweden  -1.57  -1.50  -1.15  -1.49 
Switzerland  -1.78  -1.12  -1.93  -2.17 
Greece  0.13  -0.22  0.69  0.32 
Portugal  -1.07  -0.82  -0.41  -0.61 
Spain  -2.00  -1.87  -1.73  -2.32 
Mean (CIPS test stat) -1.35  -1.16  -0.77  -1.15 
                  
Notes:  CADF(p) statistics are computed using ADF regressions with an intercept, a linear trend, and p lagged differences of the 
dependent variable, plus the lagged level and contemporaneous and p lagged differences of the cross-sectional average. The 1%,  
5% and 10% critical values are -4.58, -3.82 and -3.46, respectively. The CIPS test statistic is the cross-sectional mean, compared 
to the distribution described in Pesaran (2007) where the 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are -3.08, -2.85 and -2.7, respectively. 
* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and ***denotes significance at the 1% level.   
  
TABLE 4 
CROSS-SECTIONALLY AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER TESTS FOR UNIT ROOTS IN THE CHANGE OF 
NET FOREIGN ASSETS:GDP RATIOS, 1972-2015 
    CADF(0)   CADF(1)   CADF(2)   CADF(3) 
UK  -7.72***  -4.86***  -4.52***  -5.41*** 
Austria  -6.08***  -5.79***  -2.89  -1.86 
Denmark  -4.33***  -3.23*  -3.14*  -2.59 
France  -6.13***  -5.15***  -3.38**  -1.84 
Germany  -4.22***  -2.97*  -2.03  -1.66 
Italy  -5.06***  -3.75**  -4.06***  -2.49 
Netherlands  -7.18***  -3.00*  -2.06  -1.72 
Sweden  -5.44***  -3.77**  -3.35**  -2.24 
Switzerland  -7.71***  -5.60***  -2.82  -2.51 
Greece  -5.58***  -3.48**  -2.41  -1.45 
Portugal  -4.14***  -3.28*  -3.08*  -2.75 
Spain  -6.70***  -3.43**  -2.66  -1.94 
Mean (CIPS test stat) -5.86***  -4.03***  -3.03***  -2.37** 
         
Notes:  CADF(p) statistics are computed using ADF regressions with an intercept, p lagged differences of the dependent 
variable, plus the lagged level and contemporaneous and p lagged differences of the cross-sectional average. The 1%,  5% and 
10% critical values are -4.02, -3.32 and -2.95. The CIPS test statistic is the cross-sectional mean, compared to the distribution 
described in Pesaran (2007) where the 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are -2.56, -2.33 and -2.21, respectively. * denotes 
significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and ***denotes significance at the 1% level.   
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TABLE 5 
MAXIMIZED LOG-LIKELIHOOD VALUES 
Model 
  
LLF 
  
N 
  
χ2(r)       
M2  815.55  60  -   
         
M3  801.87  40  M3 vs. M2: 27.36 (20)  
         
M4  792.59  36  M4 vs. M2: 45.92*** (24) 
      M4 vs. M3: 18.56*** (4)  
         
M5  765.10  12  M5 vs. M4: 54.98*** (24) 
      M5 vs. M3:  73.54*** (28) 
      M5 vs. M2: 100.90*** (48) 
                  
Notes: LLF is the maximized log-likelihood value, N is the number of estimated coefficients, and χ2(r) is the likelihood ratio 
test statistic relating to the r restrictions imposed on model Mi to get to model Mj. ***denotes significance at the 1% level.   
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TABLE 6 
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES' AND AGGREGATE 
PERSISTENCE MEASURES 
  Models 
Country   M2   M3 
UK  0.72   0.74 
  (0.09)  (0.10) 
Austria  0.66   0.67 
  (0.07)  (0.08) 
Denmark  1.39   1.21 
  (0.30)  (0.18) 
France  0.64   0.68 
  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Germany  0.70   1.23 
  (0.09)  (0.22) 
Italy  0.90   0.75 
  (0.18)  (0.04) 
Netherlands  0.70   0.71 
  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Sweden  0.93   1.06 
  (0.14)  (0.04) 
Switzerland  0.69   0.75 
  (0.10)  (0.08) 
Greece  0.73   0.93 
  (0.10)  (0.11) 
Portugal  0.94   1.02  
  (0.16)  (0.13) 
Spain  0.98   0.84 
  (0.16)  (0.06) 
Aggregate  0.63   0.74  
  (0.12)  (0.08) 
         
Notes: Results relate to Models M2 and M3 defined in the text and estimated 
over 1972-2015. Individual countries' persistence measures are estimated using 
equation (2) and the aggregate persistence measures is obtained using vector w, 
a vector of ones, in place of ei and ej. Figures in parathenses are asymptotic 
standard errors calculated using analytic derivates. The formulae used are given 
in Appendix B of Lee, Pesaran and Pierse (1992, 1993).  
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TABLE 7 
DECOMPOSITION OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES' AND AGGREGATE PERSISTENCE 
MEASURES BY TYPE OF SHOCK 
  Macro shocks     
Country   Ifi   Ly   Lex   
Total 
macro 
Other 
shocks Total 
UK  0.33   0.09   0.84   0.91   1.10   1.01  
  (0.40)  (0.33)  (0.28)  (0.25)  (0.14)  (0.13) 
Austria  0.50   0.23   0.16   0.47   0.74   0.71  
  (0.34)  (0.79)  (0.81)  (0.35)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Denmark  0.60   1.42   1.48   2.67   1.19   1.28  
  (1.25)  (0.77)  (3.10)  (2.64)  (0.24)  (0.27) 
France  1.31   0.39   0.63   1.57   1.09   1.26  
  (0.42)  (0.46)  (0.44)  (0.37)  (0.18)  (0.24) 
Germany  1.78   2.70   1.61   3.26   2.14   2.58  
  (1.42)  (1.14)  (0.89)  (1.40)  (0.73)  (0.94) 
Italy  0.43   0.16   0.32   0.57   1.09   0.93  
  (0.31)  (0.68)  (0.65)  (0.44)  (0.23)  (0.21) 
Netherlands  1.24   0.47   0.01   1.25   0.77   0.87  
  (0.78)  (0.80)  (0.73)  (0.77)  (0.13)  (0.18) 
Sweden  0.73   1.23   2.42   1.84   1.00   1.14  
  (1.34)  (0.28)  (1.02)  (0.89)  (0.00)  (0.12) 
Switzerland  0.31   1.01   0.87   1.02   0.90   0.92  
  (0.67)  (1.19)  (1.13)  (1.19)  (0.09)  (0.23) 
Greece  0.86   0.58   0.12   1.15   0.95   1.06  
  (0.36)  (0.44)  (0.50)  (0.34)  (0.15)  (0.22) 
Portugal  1.06   0.68   0.66   0.99   1.42   1.21  
  (0.28)  (0.78)  (0.75)  (0.30)  (0.24)  (0.23) 
Spain  1.38   0.48   0.10   1.34   1.03   1.20  
  (0.36)  (0.57)  (0.52)  (0.34)  (0.17)  (0.25) 
Aggregate  1.03   0.02   0.15   1.06   0.87   0.99  
  (0.19)  (0.38)  (0.34)  (0.19)  (0.12)  (0.14) 
Notes: Results relate to Models Mtilde3 defined in the text and estimated over 1972-2015. Individual countries' persistence 
measures are estimated using equation (6) and the aggregate persistence measures is obtained using vector w, a vector of ones, 
in place of ei and ej. Values in parathenses are asymptotic standard errors calculated using analytic derivates. The formulae 
used are given in Appendix B of Lee, Pesaran and Pierse (1992, 1993).  
 
